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ABSTRACT 
 
 
PEIQIN ZHANG. Essays on IT governance: measurement and impacts. (Under the 
direction of DR. RAM KUMAR and DR. KEXIN ZHAO) 
 
Information Technology (IT) governance, defined as “the organizational capacity 
exercised by the Board, executive management and IT management to control the 
formulation and implementation of IT strategy and in this way ensure the fusion of 
business and IT” (De Haes and Grembergen 2004, 2005), is an important issue in the 
information system field. To better understand the role of IT governance in business 
operations, this dissertation proposes a comprehensive measure of IT governance based 
on corporate governance literature and IT leadership research. Using this newly 
proposed measure, we are able to empirically explore its impact on IT material 
weaknesses (ITMWs), IT capability, and firm performance. The dissertation consists of 
two studies. Study 1 aims to examine the impacts of firm-level characteristics and IT 
governance on ITMWs according to the integrated model from general internal control 
research. Under the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 404, all accelerated filers (companies with 
market capitalizations of $75 million or more) are mandated to disclose their internal 
control material weaknesses (MWs). If the MWs are IT related, we refer to them as 
ITMWs. Study 1 sheds light on whether effective IT governance helps to reduce 
ITMWs. Study 2 studies the effect of IT governance on IT business value based on the 
Resource-Based View (RBV) theory. In particular, study 2 investigates how IT 
governance and IT capability help to achieve firms’ competitive advantage measured 
by both market value measure and sustainable accounting performance. The impact of 
IT governance on IT capability is also examined. The dissertation is useful from 
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research as well as managerial perspectives. It represents an important contribution to 
research in both Accounting Information Systems (AIS) and Management Information 
Systems (MIS). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my dissertation advisors, Dr. 
Ram Kumar and Dr. Kexin Zhao, for their continuous support and excellent guidance 
through my dissertation. I am fortunate to be taken as a student of them. It was them 
who gave me great support, encouragement, inspiration and understanding during my 
research. Without their instructive comments and intellectual inputs at every stage of 
my dissertation process, I would not complete my doctoral dissertation. I would also 
like to thank all my dissertation committee members, Dr. Sungjune Park, Dr. Xiuli He 
and Dr. Mohammad A. Kazemi, for their precious advice, support and insights. 
In addition to my dissertation committee, I am thankful to faculty members at 
the Department of Business Information Systems and Operations Management who 
worked with me and educated me at various stages during the program. 
I would like to thank all my dear family members and friends for their love and 
support. Special thanks to Dr. Keejae Hong and Dr. Anderson Robert for their 
continuous encouragement, motivation, support and help.  
 
 
  
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES                                                                                                          ix 
LIST OF FIGURES                                                                                                         x 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION                                                                                    1 
1.1. Motivation                                                                                                            1 
1.2. Operationalization of IT Governance Construct 3 
1.3. Research Objectives and Research Questions 5 
1.4. Organization of the Dissertation 7 
CHAPTER 2: THE IMPACTS OF FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND IT                    8 
GOVERNANCE ON IT CONTROL MATERIAL WEAKNESSES 
 
2.1. Introduction 8 
2.2. SOX 404, Internal Control, IT Internal Control, and IT Governance 11 
2.3. Literature Review 14 
2.4. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 16 
2.4.1. Firm Characteristics and IT Internal Control Weaknesses 16 
2.4.2. IT Governance and IT Internal Control Weaknesses 20 
2.5. Variable Definitions and Research Model 23 
2.5.1. Dependent and Independent Variables 23 
2.5.2. Control Variables 24 
2.6. Research Methodology 27 
2.6.1. Data Sources and Collection 27 
2.6.2. Sample Data 28 
2.7. Data Analysis and Results 31 
vii 
 
2.7.1. Univariate Analysis 31 
2.7.2. Logistic Regression Analysis 36 
2.7.3. Analysis of Recession Effects 39 
2.8. Discussion and Conclusion 39 
CHAPTER 3: IT GOVERNANCE, IT CAPABILITY AND FIRM                             42    
PERFORMANCE: AN INTEGRATED MODEL 
 
3.1. Introduction 42 
3.2. Literature Review 45 
3.2.1. IT Capability and Firm Performance 45 
3.2.2. IT Governance and Firm Performance 47 
3.2.3. IT Governance and IT Capability 49 
3.3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 51 
3.3.1. IT Governance and Firm Performance 51 
3.3.2. IT Capability and Firm Performance 53 
3.3.3. IT Governance and IT Capability 55 
3.4. Variable Definitions and Research Model 57 
3.4.1. Dependent Variables (Firm Performance Measurements) 57 
3.4.2. Independent Variables (IT Capability Measurement) 59 
3.4.3. Independent Variables (IT Governance Score) 59 
3.4.4. Control Variables 59 
3.5. Research Methodology 62 
3.5.1. Data Sources and Collection 62 
3.5.2. Two-Stage Econometrics Methods 63 
3.6. Data Analysis and Results 65 
viii 
 
3.6.1. Descriptive statistics 65 
3.6.2. Empirical Results 69 
3.7. Concluding Remarks and Discussion 73 
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK                                             76 
4.1. Summary 76 
4.2. Future Research 77 
REFERENCES                                                                                                               78 
  
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
TABLE 1: The proposed construct of IT governance 5 
TABLE 2: Definition of variables in study1 26 
TABLE 3: Examples of ITMWs 30 
TABLE 4: ITMWs reported by industry segments 32 
TABLE 5: Descriptive statistics in study 1 33 
TABLE 6: Pearson correlation analysis in study 1 35 
TABLE 7: Logistic regression analysis 38 
TABLE 8: Definition of variables in study 2 61 
TABLE 9: Sample selection 63 
TABLE 10: Descriptive statistics in study 2 66 
TABLE 11: Pearson correlation in study 2 68 
TABLE 12: Econometric results 72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
FIGURE 1: The research model of study 1 24 
FIGURE 2: Literature review and synthesis 50 
FIGURE 3: The research model of study 2 57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Motivation 
IT governance, defined as “the organizational capacity exercised by the Board, 
executive management and IT management to control the formulation and 
implementation of IT strategy and in this way ensure the fusion of business and IT” 
(De Haes and Grembergen 2004, 2005), is an important issue in the IS field. The 
definition of IT governance from the IT Governance Institute (ITGI) also indicates that 
IT governance is an integral part of enterprise governance and consists of the 
leadership and organizational structures and processes that ensure that the 
organization’s IT sustains and extends the organization’s strategy and objectives (ITGI 
2001).  
Nowadays, IT governance is on the agenda of many organizations. The ultimate 
goal of IT governance is to achieve strategic alignment between IT and the firms’ 
overall business to ensure that IT investment is delivering value for the business (De 
Haes and Grembergen 2005). There is some research on the impact of the internal and 
external governance on IT control quality, and the impact of IT governance on firm 
performance (Li et al. 2007; Boritz and Lim working paper). However, there is limited 
research on a comprehensive measure of IT governance and its impacts.  
De Haes and Grembergen (2004, 2005) described IT governance and its 
mechanisms, and indicated that IT governance can be deployed using a mixture of 
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various structures, processes and relational mechanisms. But they used survey and case 
study to get the data for the measurement of IT governance mechanisms. Li et al. 
(2007) examined the influence of senior management, the board of directors, and audit 
committee regarding IT control governance, and provided evidence on the effects of 
internal and external governance on IT control quality (Li et al. 2007, pp.226). In their 
paper, they measure the IT control governance as function of CEO or CFO with IT 
experience, with CIO position, longer tenured CIO, other senior management with IT 
experience, percentages of independent directors, and audit committee member with IT 
experience. They looked at the direct effects of these indicators on IT controls. Boritz 
and Lim (working paper) measure the IT governance effectiveness as a function of the 
IT knowledge of top company executives and board members, the tenure of CIO and 
the presence of an IT strategy committee. They only looked at top management IT 
background, board members IT background, the length of the CIO’s tenure and the 
presence of an IT strategy committee for the measurement of IT governance. After 
reviewing previous literature about IT governance measures, this dissertation seeks to 
develop a new construct called ITGOV-score and operationalize a comprehensive 
measure of IT governance based on public available secondary data. Using this newly 
proposed measure, we empirically explore the impact of IT governance on IT material 
weaknesses (ITMWs), IT capability, and the firms’ market performance and 
sustainable accounting performance.  
The dissertation is expected to be useful from the research as well as managerial 
perspectives. From a research perspective, this is an early attempt to propose and 
operationalize a new construct ITGOV with a comprehensive measure, and examine its 
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impacts. It represents an important contribution to research in both Accounting 
Information Systems (AIS) and Management Information Systems (MIS). From the 
managerial perspective, firms’ management may use our measure and results to build 
an efficient IT governance committee, and effectively integrate IT resources with 
organizations’ other resources to realize business value of IT. 
1.2. Operationalization of IT Governance Construct 
Based on corporate governance literature and IT leadership research (Brown and 
Caylor 2006; Amstrong and Sambamurthy 1999; Bassellier et al. 2003; Daily and 
Dalton 1993), we develop more indicators in our measurement in addition to the 
indicators developed by Li et al. (2007), Lim et al. (2013) and Boritz and Lim (working 
paper). Different from Li and Lim et al.’s and Boritz & Lim’s paper, which examined 
the direct effects of each indicator, we categorize the indicators in our study into three 
groups (oversight, leadership IT background and IT leadership importance) based on 
corporate governance literature (Brown and Caylor 2006). This construct is related to 
the definition of IT governance. Leadership IT background and IT leadership 
importance are important factors since they are driving force for effective and efficient 
IT governance that help to ensure the fusion of business and IT. The reason we include 
oversight factors in our measurement is because the board effectiveness in its 
monitoring function is determined by its independence, size, and composition (insider 
and outsider) (John and Senbet 1998), and the oversight function helps to control the 
formulation and implementation of IT strategy.  
We develop the IT governance matrix and calculate ITGOV-score based on 
corporate governance literature (Brown and Caylor 2006). In the corporate governance 
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literature, Gov-score is created as a summary governance measure based on 51 firm-
specific provisions representing both internal and external governance. Similarly, we 
construct ITGOV-score as a summary IT governance measure based on 11 factors 
encompassing three categories representing both internal and external IT governance. 
Therefore, our measurement of IT governance is broader in scope, and is an 
improvement from the previous measure. The proposed construct is summarized in 
Table 1.  
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Table 1: The proposed construct of IT governance 
Indicators Li et al. (2007) 
Lim et al. (2013) 
Boritz and Lim 
(working paper) 
My dissertation 
Oversight    
Big 4    
Independent board of 
directors 
   
    
Leadership IT 
background 
   
CEO, CFO has IT 
experience 
   
TOP management with 
IT experience 
   
Board of directors with 
IT experience 
   
Audit committees with 
IT experience 
   
    
IT leadership 
importance 
   
CIO position     
CIO year    
CIO compensation    
CIO-TMT pay gap    
IT strategy committee    
 
1.3. Research Objectives and Research Questions 
The dissertation consists of two studies, described briefly below.  
Study 1 focuses on the impacts of firm-level characteristics and IT governance 
on ITMWs according to the integrated model from general internal control research 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Ge and McVay 2005). With the 
prevalence of IT in today’s business environment, many organizations have put the 
development of an effective and efficient IT in the front of their overall IT 
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management. IT plays a critical role and continues to grow in importance for 
operational and strategic information systems of an organization in the 21st century. 
Global IT spending rose by eight percent, to more than $1.5 trillion year-over-year in 
2010, the best growth in the IT sector since 2007 (IT black book by IDC report). IT 
brings us a fast, convenient and efficient environment and also provides a competitive 
advantage for the organizations. Nowadays, many organizations’ financial processes 
and transactions are driven by information systems. However, with the economic 
improvement of IT and widespread reliance on IT for operational and financial 
management systems, organizations are confronting greater challenges to provide 
accurate, reliable, integrate, and timely information, and IT controls have long been 
recognized as necessary and important for organizations (ITGI 2006, pp22). In the 
operations process, there exist IT-related internal control problems and risks, such as 
IT security, access control and software errors, etc. Therefore, it is important for 
auditors, managers, regulators, and investors to understand ITMWs. Understanding of 
ITMWs by managers can help them take proper actions to remediate ITMWs in a 
timely manner. Understanding of ITMWs by regulators helps them enact or update 
policies to regulate the companies to provide the assurance of reliability and integrity 
of financial reporting and instills investors’ confidence on the financial reporting. 
Understanding of ITMWs by investors helps them make their investment decisions 
carefully. A body of recent research has studied the role of general MWs in ensuring 
the integrity and reliability of firms’ financial reporting, and instilling investors’ 
confidence (Ge & McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). A 
few studies have examined the role of internal and external governance on ITMWs 
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(Lim et al. 2007). However, a gap exists to study the antecedents of ITMWs at both the 
firm level and IT governance level. There is very limited understanding of the role of 
IT governance in reducing ITMWs. To fill this gap, we intend to answer the following 
research question in study 1: How are the firm level characteristics and IT governance 
associated with ITMWs? 
Study 2 intends to look at the role of IT governance on IT business value based 
on Resource-Based View (RBV) theory. In particular, study 2 investigates how IT 
governance and IT capability help to achieve firms’ competitive advantage using both a 
market value measure and a sustainable accounting performance measure, and how IT 
governance affects IT capability superiority. Despite substantial research on IT 
capability and firm performance (Bharadwaj 2000; Santahanam et al. 2003; Wang et al. 
2007; Muhanna et al. 2010), there is no research to investigate the impact of IT 
governance on IT capability, and to simultaneously examine the impacts of IT 
governance and IT capability on firm performance. To fill this gap, we intend to 
answer the following research questions in study 2:  
(a). How is IT governance related to IT capability?  
(b). How are IT governance and IT capability simultaneously associated with firm 
performance? 
1.4. Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents study 1. Chapter 3 
demonstrates the research model, methodology, findings and expected contributions of 
study 2. Chapter 4 provides the summary of this dissertation and discusses some future 
work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE IMPACTS OF FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND IT 
GOVERNANCE ON IT CONTROL MATERIAL WEAKNESSES  
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we examine the impacts of both firm characteristics and IT 
governance on ITMWs in internal control over financial reporting (ICOFR). Under 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 404, all accelerated filers (companies with market 
capitalizations of $75 million or more) are mandated to disclose their internal control 
problems. Material weakness (MW), which is the most severe internal control 
deficiency, is defined by Auditing Standard (AS) No. 51 as “a significant deficiency, or 
combination of significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood 
that a material misstatement of the financial statements would not be prevented or 
detected on timely basis by the company” (PCAOB 2007). If the MWs are IT related, 
we refer to them as ITMWs. 
ICOFR is designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of 
financial reporting to instill investors’ confidence. High quality and effective internal 
controls are necessary to ensure the reliability and integrity of companies’ financial 
reporting for stakeholders and investors. Nowadays, firms’ business and financial 
transactions and processes are driven by information systems. Effective internal 
controls over information systems are therefore necessary. If companies disclose at 
                                                 
1 On July 25, 2007, the US SEC approved AS No. 5, which replaced the PCAOB’s previous internal 
control auditing standard, AS No. 2. 
9 
 
least one ITMW, their IT controls are considered ineffective and of lower quality. If 
companies do not disclose any ITMWs, IT controls are considered effective and of 
high quality (Li et al. 2007). Common types of ITMWs in SOX 404 reports include 
deficiencies in IT environment, computer operations, accounting software, security and 
access control, data backup and disaster recovery.  
IT plays a critical role and continues to grow in importance for organizations in 
the 21st century. Global IT spending rose by eight percent, to more than $1.5 trillion in 
2010 (IDC report). Nowadays, with the prevalence of IT and Internet-based 
transactions, firms’ financial reporting processes are driven by information systems. 
Such systems are deeply embedded in initiating, authorizing, modification, recording, 
processing, retrieving and reporting of financial data and transactions. Therefore, “they 
are inextricably linked to the overall financial reporting processes and need to be 
assessed, along with other important processes for compliance with the SOX” (ITGI 
2004, pp19).  
A number of recent studies have examined the MWs to ensure the integrity and 
reliability of firms’ financial reporting (Ge & McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 2007; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). Since many organizational processes and financial 
transactions are driven by information systems, IT-related internal control problems 
and risks are common in the internal control processes. For example, companies have 
installed accounting software that does not prevent erroneous or unauthorized changes 
to previous reporting periods and does not provide an adequate audit trail of entries 
made in the accounting software. Both auditors and management need to understand 
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the impact of factors associated with presence and absence of IT internal control 
problems. Therefore, we are motivated to study ITMWs. 
According to previous research (Grant et al., 2008; Li et al., 2007), a gap exists 
to study the antecedents of ITMWs at both firm characteristics and IT governance. Ge 
& McVay (2005), Doyle et al. (2007) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) studied the 
antecedents of internal control deficiencies (ICDs) based on firm characteristics. Weill 
(2004) indicated that excellent IT governance can bring firms stock-market premiums. 
Grant et al. (2008) examined the relationship between IT internal control deficiencies 
and accounting errors, which they found to be positively related. Li et al. (2007) 
examined the effects of internal and external governance on ITMWs, and found that 
firms with more IT-experienced senior managers, with CIO positions or longer tenured 
CIO and with higher percentages of independent board of directors are less likely to 
have ITMWs. The findings in Li’s study also partially indicated that more IT-
experienced audit committee members are linked to less ITMWs. In addition, their 
results suggested that internal and external governance play significant roles in IT 
control quality. However, no available analysis exists to examine the antecedents of 
ITMWs based on both firm characteristics and IT governance. To fill this gap, we 
intend to answer the following research question in this study: How are the firm 
characteristics and IT governance associated with ITMWs? We believe that a better 
understanding of firm characteristics and IT governance factors associated with 
ITMWs disclosure can benefit both researchers and practitioners. Understanding of 
ITMWs by executives could help them take proper actions to remediate ITMWs. 
Understanding of ITMWs by regulators could help them enact or update policies and 
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standards to regulate the organizations. It could also provide the assurance of reliability 
and integrity of financial reporting and help instill investors’ confidence of financial 
reporting. Understanding of ITMWs by investors can help them make better 
investment decisions. Our contribution made in this study is in two-fold. First, we 
examine the impacts of both firm characteristics and IT governance on ITMWs. 
Second, we propose a new construct called ITGOV, and create a new way to 
objectively quantify firms’ IT governance based on secondary data. 
The remained of study 1 is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the 
background of SOX 404, internal control, IT internal control and IT governance. 
Section 2.3 provides a literature review. Section 2.4 introduces the theoretical 
background and develops the hypotheses. Section 2.5 describes the definition of 
variables and constructs the research model. Section 2.6 discusses the research 
methods. Section 2.7 presents the empirical findings.  The final section discusses the 
implications of this study and provides some concluding comments. 
2.2. SOX 404, Internal Control, IT Internal Control, and IT Governance 
Internal control over financial reporting (ICOFR) is designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting to instill investors’ 
confidence. ICOFR are defined by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
as: “ A process designed by, or under the supervision of, the registrant’s principal 
executive and principal financial officers, or persons performing similar functions, and 
effected by the registrant’s board of directors, management and other personnel, to 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the 
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally 
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accepted accounting principles and includes those policies and procedures……” (SEC 
2003). 
Prior to SOX, the first legislative act, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
of 1977 provided regulatory standards for internal control over financial reporting. The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 expanded 
the regulatory authority over internal controls, and required banks to establish and 
maintain a documented internal controls system. However, those regulatory oversights 
over internal controls were limited in scope. Massive business failures and accounting 
frauds in companies such as Enron and WorldCom eroded investors’ confidence due to 
the lack of internal controls. As a reaction to these corporate scandals, the SOX Act of 
2002 was enacted on July 30, 2002 to provide enhanced standards, and expanded the 
scope to all public companies.  
Under the SOX Act of 2002 section 302, the executives of companies are 
required to certify in the periodic reports (10Qs and 10Ks) that they have reviewed the 
report and the effectiveness of the internal controls systems, and they have identified 
material changes in internal controls (Beneish et al., 2008). Under the SOX 404, all 
accelerated filers (companies with market capitalizations of $75 million or more) are 
mandated to disclose their internal control problems. Management is required to 
provide an internal control report and assess the effectiveness of their internal control 
structures and procedures over financial reporting that is attested to by the firm’s public 
accountants. In addition, the auditor of the firms is required to provide an adverse 
opinion on the assessment made by the management.  
13 
 
Material weaknesses are the problems in the internal control process. Material 
weakness, which is the most severe internal control deficiencies, is defined by AS No. 
5 as “a significant deficiency, or combination of significant deficiencies, that results in 
more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the financial statements 
would not be prevented or detected on timely basis by the company” (PCAOB, 2007). 
For example, inconsistent application of accounting policies, lack of adequately staffed 
accounting departments. ITMWs are the IT-related problems in the internal control 
process. For example, accounting software does not prevent erroneous or unauthorized 
changes to previous reporting periods; ERP system contained programming errors.  
Effective internal control over information systems has been recognized as an 
integral part of reliable financial reporting by managers, regulators, and auditors in 
today’s computer-intensive world. IT controls are considered significant components 
of internal controls. PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 (2007) discusses the relationship 
of IT and internal control over financial reporting and emphasizes the importance of 
identifying IT controls and testing their design and operational effectiveness (PCAOB 
2007). Companies are mandated to report significant ITMWs by following the SOX 
requirements and PCAOB auditing standards (Grant et al. 2008). The auditors are 
required to assess the extent of IT involvement in the period-end financial reporting 
process. The identification of risks and controls within IT is an integral part of the top-
down approach used to identify significant accounts and disclosures and their relevant 
assertions (PCAOB 2007).  
IT governance literature has emphasized the importance of the responsibilities 
and role of senior management leadership and boards in IT governance (Dahlberg and 
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Kivijärvi 2006). IT Governance Institute defines the IT governance as: “IT governance 
is the responsibility of the board of directors and executive management. It is an 
integral part of the corporate governance and comprises of the leadership, the 
organizational structure and processes that ensure the IT sustains of the organization 
and the extensional strategies and goals of the organization” (ITGL 2003).  The COBIT 
board briefing (ITGL 2003, p6-9) defines that top management is beginning to realize 
the important impact of IT on the enterprise’s successfulness. As this impact relies 
largely on the operation of IT and the leverage of IT business value, executives and 
boards have to expand governance to IT and provide necessary leadership. Firms with 
stronger IT governance are more likely to reduce ITMWs due to the experience and 
knowledge in use of IT. 
2.3. Literature Review 
In the accounting and economics areas, a number of recent studies have dealt 
with the determinants of general internal control weaknesses under SOX 302 and 404 
Act (Ge and McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). Ge and 
McVay (2005) found that firms with internal control problems and material 
weaknesses disclosure are smaller, more complex and less profitable than the firms 
without ICDs disclosure. Furthermore, Ge and McVay (2005) reported that 2.8% of 
technology issues are reflected in the 493 material weakness disclosures, such as access 
controls and documentation issues. Doyle et al. (2007) investigated the determinants of 
internal control weakness over financial reporting and verified the results reported by 
Ge and McVay (2005). Doyle et al. (2007) added more characteristics, such as growth, 
undergoing restructuring and corporate governance. They found that organizations 
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reporting internal control material weaknesses are younger, growing fast, or 
undergoing restructuring.  In addition, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) found 
organizations disclosing internal control weaknesses have less resources invested in 
internal control, greater accounting risk exposure, more recent organizational structure 
change, and more complicated operations.  
There is very limited research on ITMWs and the quality of IT internal 
controls. Weill (2004) indicated that better IT controls can bring firms stock-market 
premiums (Weill 2004). Grant et al. (2008) examined the relationship of IT controls on 
financial reporting process, focusing on accounting errors, and concluded that 
accounting errors occur more often in firms with ITMWs. From IT governance 
perspective, Li et al. (2007) examined the internal and external influences on IT 
controls, and suggested that companies with more IT-experienced senior managers, 
with CIO positions or longer tenured CIO and with higher percentages of independent 
board directors are less likely to have ITMWs. However, there is no research that has 
examined both firm characteristics and IT governance’s influences on firms’ reporting 
ITMWs at the same time. There exists a potential gap with the study of the antecedents 
of the ITMWs. Our study is different with the previous study in two ways. First, we 
investigate the antecedents of ITMWs in internal control over financial reporting from 
the factors of both firm characteristics and IT governance perspective using firms’ 
SOX 404 report data. The second distinction is that we propose a new variable called 
ITGOV and establish a new way to capture ITGOV score based on the secondary data.  
From the firm characteristics perspective, we follow the literature on 
determinants of general ICDs study (Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007) to 
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identify relevant firm level characteristics associated with ITMWs. According to 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007), eight firm level characteristics are identified as 
antecedents of ICDs. We hypothesize that they are also the influential risk factors of 
ITMWs. From the IT governance perspective, we create ITGOV-score, a summary IT 
governance measure based on 11 factors representing both internal and external 
governance according to the corporate governance matrix proposed by Brown and 
Caylor (2006).  
2.4. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
In the previous literature, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) have proposed a model 
to investigate the antecedents of ICDs from the firm characteristics perspective. We 
believe that these firm characteristics also affect ITMWs as well since ITMWs are one 
special category of general ICDs. Therefore, we applied this integrated model to our 
study. In addition, we believe that IT governance may play an important role on the 
absence or presence of ITMWs. Therefore, we add IT governance as an additional 
factor in our model.  
2.4.1. Firm Characteristics and IT Internal Control Weaknesses 
Prior research has found that firms with less effective resources and 
profitability, or that are financially weaker may not be able to invest money and/or time 
in proper controls. Good internal controls require effective financial resources (Doyle 
et al. 2007). Financial resources refer to the capital resources available for IT and 
control systems investment (Chwelos et al. 2001). Investment in internal controls and 
information systems will depend on a firm’s financial resources and strategies 
(Kivijärvi & Saarinen 1995). Good internal controls and information systems require 
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adequate financial investments in the IT infrastructure, IT applications, and other 
important IT resources. Therefore, we posit that there are more ITMWs in firms that 
perform poorly, or have higher financial distress risks since they are less likely to have 
adequate investment in information systems and internal controls, and more likely to 
have staffing issues that result in ITMWs, such as segregation of duties. Consistent 
with previous literature (Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Henry et al. 
2011), we use two measures: loss (LOSS) and financial distress risk (RZSCORE) as 
proxies for financial health (HEALTH). LOSS is measured as a dummy variable. It is 
coded as 1 if the sum of income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) in year t  
and year 1t  is less than zero and 0 otherwise. RZSCORE is measured as the Decile 
rank of Altman’s z-score, where higher rank values indicate less distress risk (Altman 
1968). We expect a positive relationship on LOSS and a negative relationship on 
RZSCORE. 
H1a: Firms with losses are more likely to have ITMWs. 
H1b: Firms with higher distress risk are more likely to have ITMWs. 
Operations complexity refers to that a firm has multiple geographic or business 
divisions (Doyle et al. 2007). As a firm operates in many business segments and 
diversified geographic segments, such as different industries and international 
operations, its transactions are more likely to be complicated, and result in undetectable 
material misstatement of the financial statements. Therefore, there is a higher need for 
internal controls for the firms with more complex and diversified transactions or 
operations since there is a higher possibility for internal control weaknesses (Doyle et 
al. 2007). Firm size, employee quality, risk management processes, IT systems type, 
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and complexity of product lines as well as many other factors can impact the internal 
controls type (Lewis, 2004). We expect that there are more ITMWs for firms whose 
operations are more complex due to multiple product lines and business segments. 
Consistent with previous literature (Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; 
Henry et al. 2011), two measures: business segments (SEGs), and foreign sales 
(FRNSALE), are used as proxies for firms’ operations complexity. SEGs are measured 
as the number of business segments the firm operated (Compustat Segment file) in year
t . FRNSALE is measured as a dummy variable. It is coded as 1 if a firm reports 
foreign sales in year t  (Non-zero value of Compustat #150) and 0 otherwise.  
H2a:  Firms with more diverse segments are more likely to have ITMWs. 
H2b: Firms involved in foreign sales are more likely to have ITMWs. 
We consider the factor of the firms’ accounting measurement application risks 
in applying generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) through the level of 
inventory and rapid growth (Kinney & McDaniel 1989). The level of firms’ inventory 
may lead to value changes due to obsolescence, and the manager’s judgment is 
required in applying GAAP (Henry et al. 2011). Firms with a higher level of inventory 
confront increased IT internal control risks related to the accurate recording and 
measurement of inventory (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). Level of inventory 
(INVNTRY) is measured as inventory over total assets (Compustat #3/#6). A rapid 
growing firm may require more time to establish new procedures and set up IT 
infrastructures and applications. As a result, it may incur many IT internal control 
problems (Kinney & Mcdaniel 1989; Stice 1991). Moreover, rapidly growing firms are 
more likely to encounter personnel, processes, and technology issues with the 
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expansion of the scope and complexity of the operations, and result in outgrowing IT 
internal controls. Rapid growth (GROWTH) is measured as average percent change in 
sales in previous three years (Percentage change in Compustat #12). 
H3a: Firms with a higher level of inventory are more likely to have ITMWs. 
H3b: Firms undergoing rapid growth are more likely to have ITMWs. 
We consider the organizational structural change factor through mergers & 
acquisitions and restructurings. There is a unique need for internal controls for the 
particular operating environment of each firm (Doyle et al. 2007). The need for internal 
controls will change correspondingly with the changes of environment. In addition, 
restructuring of the firm often leads to departments downsizing, experienced 
employees loss, and general disorder during and after the firm re-engineering. 
Therefore, the internal controls systems have to be upgraded to keep pace with the new 
structures and procedures of the firms (Doyle et al. 2007). We believe that insufficient 
IT employees, less familiarity with the new technologies and environment as well as 
more adjustments estimation, are likely to result in more ITMWs. Restructuring 
(RSTRCHA) is measured as a dummy variable. It is coded as 1 if a firm has been 
involved in a restructuring in previous three years (at least one of the following 
Compustat annual data items is not equal to 0: #376, #377, #378 or #379) and 0 
otherwise. Firms engaging in mergers and acquisitions confront significant IT internal 
control difficulties when integrating their information systems, IT infrastructures, IT 
applications, and IT structures with those of acquired firms. Such firms are more likely 
to have IT internal controls problems. Mergers and acquisitions (MA) is measured as a 
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dummy variable. It is coded as 1 if a firm has been involved in a merger or acquisition 
over the previous three years (Compustat AFTNT #1) and 0 otherwise. 
H4a: Firms undergoing restructuring are more likely to have ITMWs. 
H4b: Firms engaging in mergers and acquisitions are more likely to have 
ITMWs. 
2.4.2. IT Governance and IT Internal Control Weaknesses 
According to the prior literature (Li et al. 2007; Mishra et al. 2009), we expect 
IT governance to play a role in ensuring firm’s IT internal controls quality. Good IT 
governance over planning and life cycle control objectives should result in more 
accurate and timely financial reporting (Mishra et al. 2009). In this study, we combine 
two streams of study to construct IT governance score based on secondary data. We got 
the detail indicators from IT governance and IT leadership literature (Bassellier et al. 
2003; Li et al. 2007). In contrast to previous literature (Li et al. 2007; Boritz and Lim, 
working paper), which examined the direct effects of each indicator, we categorize our 
indicators into three groups (oversight, leadership IT background and IT leadership 
importance). We develop our IT governance matrix based on corporate governance 
literature (Brown and Caylor 2006). In the corporate governance literature, Gov-score 
is created as a summary governance measure based on 51 firm-specific provisions 
representing both internal and external governance. Similarly, we construct ITGOV-
score as a summary IT governance measure based on 11 factors (Big4, independent 
board of directors, CEO or CFO with IT experience, top management with IT 
experience, board of directors with IT experience, audit committee with IT experience, 
CIO position, CIO tenure year, CIO compensation, CIO-TMT pay gap, IT strategy 
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committee) encompassing three categories representing both internal and external IT 
governance. We code factors of Big4, IT strategy committee, CEO or CFO with IT 
experience, and CIO position as either 1 or 0; we code factors of top management with 
IT experience, audit committee with IT experience, directors with IT experience, 
independent board of directors and CIO-TMT pay gap as a ratio between 0 and 1; we 
code CIO tenure year and CIO compensation as Decile rank of real number, then 
divide by 10 to get the ratio between 0 and 1. We then sum the 11 variables to get the 
ITGOV-Score. 
We argue that firms with stronger oversight function are more likely to 
supervise top managers’ behavior in IT implementation and controls. The audit 
committee plays a role to provide the oversight on the financial reporting process to 
ensure the high quality of financial reporting. Big 4 auditors are more likely to 
effectively oversee IT control due to their professional knowledge, practical 
experience, and reputation. Boards with more independent directors better execute 
board oversight.  
Bassellier et al. (2003) stated that the set of IT-related experience that 
executives possess enables them to exhibit IT leadership in their area of business. IT 
experience increases their understanding of IT, which in turn enables them to increase 
their leadership in the IT domain. Top Managers, executives, board of directors and 
committee members are more likely to assume leadership in regard to IT when they 
have the appropriate IT experience and knowledge (Bassellier et al. 2003). We believe 
that leadership who has IT background is more likely to make sure that IT is 
appropriately managed and resourced. Leadership with IT knowledge and experience 
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may respond to IT internal control weaknesses the company face in a timely manner 
and remediate them appropriately. In addition, leaderships’ IT background will help 
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of business operations. Therefore, we expect 
leadership with IT background have influence on IT operations and IT controls of the 
company.  
If the companies have IT leadership importance (e.g. CIO position, longer 
tenured CIO, CIO with higher level of compensation, IT strategy committee), this 
indicates the importance of IT in the company’s overall management. The more 
experienced CIO or CTO a company has, the more likely they can better manage IT to 
meet the internal control and reporting requirements of the company. In addition, a 
CIO or CTO with longer tenure is likely to better understand the companies’ operating 
systems and ITMWs based on their experience. Besides the IT executive involvement 
in a top management team (TMT), IT executive incentives are also a fundamental 
factor of IT leadership for achieving business alignment. Drawn upon executive 
compensation literature (Masli et al. 2009), executives’ incentives are motivated by 
compensation. So we argue that CIO’s behavior is motivated by CIO compensation. 
And CIO compensation is regarded as an incentive alignment mechanism. CIO with 
higher level of compensation has higher motivation to engage in behaviors or actions 
towards enhancing IT controls quality and effectiveness. CIO-TMT pay gap is viewed 
as a proxy of CIO level of acceptance by other members of the TMT team. Higher 
(lower) pay gap is an indication of lower (higher) level of acceptance by the TMT. CIO 
with lower level acceptance may have less motivation and may contribute less on the 
IT controls quality and effectiveness.  
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H5:  Better IT-governed firms are less likely to have ITMWs. 
2.5. Variable Definitions and Research Model 
2.5.1. Dependent and Independent Variables 
Based on the hypotheses, ITMWs are influenced by firms’ loss (LOSS) and 
distress risk (RZSCORE), which are proxies for financial health (HEALTH) of the 
firms; business segments (SEGs) and foreign sales (FRNSALE), which are proxies for 
the complexity of operations (COMPLEX); level of inventory (INVNTRY) and rapid 
growth (GROWTH), which are proxies for the accounting measurement application 
risks (AMAR) in applying GAAP; restructuring (RSTRCHA) and mergers & 
acquisitions (MA), which are proxies for the organizational structure change 
(ORGSCNG); IT governance score (ITGOV), which is proxy for the effectiveness of 
IT governance. Therefore, ITMWs is the dependent variable in our model, which is 
coded as 1 if a firm disclosed ITMWs in the SOX 404 report, 0 otherwise. The 
independent variables are nine influential factors including LOSS, RZSCORE, SEGs, 
FRNSALE, INVNTRY, GROWTH, RSTRCHA, MA and ITGOV. The research model 
is shown as Figure1. 
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Figure 1: The research model of study 1 
 
2.5.2. Control Variables 
In our model, we control for firm size and firm age based on prior studies (e.g., 
Ge & McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). Larger firms have 
more resources to invest in internal controls and information systems, and are more 
likely to have qualified employees to ensure adequate segregation of duties in IT 
applications (Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). Unlike Doyle et al. 
(2007), we control for firm age since we posit that the older firms still use the old, and 
in some cases possibly obsolete information systems in financial transactions, reporting 
and other important processes. In addition, they might retain IT personnel with 
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outdated IT skills, and this in turn might result in misstatement of IT internal controls. 
Therefore, older firms are more likely to disclose ITMWs. 
The definition and description of the variables in this study is summarized in 
Table 2. The next section introduces the basis of our model and research methods that 
we adopted.  
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Table 2: Definition of variables in study1 
Variables Observable 
measures 
Definition and description 
ITMWs  1 if the firm disclosed ITMWs in the SOX 404 report; 0 
otherwise. 
HEALTH LOSS Indicator Variable coded as 1 if the sum of income before 
extraordinary items (Compustat #18) in year t and year t-1 is 
less than zero; 0 otherwise. 
RZSCORE Decile rank of Altman’s (1980) z-score, where higher rank 
values indicate less distress risk. 
COMPLEX SEGs The number of business segments the firm 
reported(Compustat Segment file) in year  t. 
FRNSALE Indicator variable coded as 1 if a firm reports foreign sales in 
year  t  (Non-zero value of Compustat #150); 0, otherwise 
AMAR INVNTRY Inventory over total assets (Compustat #3/ #6). 
GROWTH Average percent change in sales in previous three years 
(Percentage change in Compustat #12). 
ORGSCNG RSTRCHA Indicator variable coded as 1 if a firm has been involved in a 
restructuring in previous three years (at least one of the 
following Compustat annual data items is not equal to 0: 
#376, #377, #378 or #379); 0, otherwise 
MA Indicator variable coded as 1 if a firm has been involved in a 
merger or acquisition over the previous three years 
(Compustat AFTNT #1); 0 otherwise. 
ITGOV Big4 1 if auditor is a big four, 0 otherwise. 
INDBRD Percentage of independent directors on the board. 
CEFOIT 1 if the CEO or CFO has IT-related experience; 0 otherwise. 
MGMTIT Percentage of top management with IT-related experience. 
BRDIT Percentage of Board of directors with IT-related experience. 
COMMIT Percentage of audit committee members with IT-related 
experience. 
CITO 1 if company has CIO or CTO position; 0 otherwise. 
CITOYR Number of years (s) he has been the position in the company. 
lnCIOCOMP The natural log of the CIO salary and bonus in the year of 
disclosing ITMWs and/or the preceding year. 
CIOTMTCOMP The ratio of the CIO salary and bonus to the average salary 
and bonus of the non-IT executive. 
ITSTRCOMT 1 if company has IT strategic committee; 0 otherwise. 
Control 
variables 
SIZE Firm size: the natural logarithm of the total assets (Compustat 
#6) of the firm. 
AGE Firm age: the log of the number of years the firm has CRSP 
data. 
ITMWs = IT material weaknesses 
HEALTH = Financial health 
COMPLEX = Operations complexity 
AMAR = Accounting measurement application risk 
ORGSCNG = Organizational structure change 
ITGOV = IT governance 
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2.6. Research Methodology 
A logistic regression analysis is performed to predict the ITMWs after 
screening the data to check for the missing values, outliers, multicollinearity, and 
normality of the distribution.  
2.6.1. Data Sources and Collection 
We start with the Audit Analytics database (SOX 404 reports) and identify the 
initial sample from the firms that disclose their effectiveness of internal control in their 
annual financial report. We examine seven years data in this study from Jan 2005 to 
Dec 2011 since SOX section 404 became effective for accelerated filers starting from 
November 15, 2004.  We search firms’ SEC 10-K filings from the EDGAR database to 
identify whether they have MWs disclosure. If the company has MWs, we then 
determine whether the MWs are IT-related based on whether a MW is related to 
information systems, IT, software errors, data or information systems security2.  
Management’s reports on internal controls are coded as illustrated by the 
following example. Consider a firm which discloses that the internal control is not 
effective as of Dec 31, 2010 due to lack of segregation of duties. At this point, we have 
to identify if this firm has insufficient IT personnel, accounting personnel, or other 
personnel to finalize whether this MW is IT-related or not. If it has insufficient IT 
personnel, we code it as ITMW (1); otherwise, we code it as none-ITMW (0). We 
retrieve all financial data from annual Compustat database, such as firms’ total assets, 
total liabilities, and total revenue. We obtain the business segment data from 
Compustat Segment files, and acquire firm stock data from CRSP database. We collect 
                                                 
2 Please refer to sample data section for more examples of IT-related material weaknesses. 
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the IT governance data from a combination of proxy statement, 10-K filings, and firms’ 
website and Mergent online database. 
Consistent with previous research, we select the control firms by matching the 
industry code (SIC code) and size (total assets) during the year in which ITMWs were 
disclosed (Li et al. 2007; Purnanandam & Swaminathan 2004). Since all firms 
reporting ITMWs also have general MWs, our control group consists of firms with 
non-IT related MWs but may with general MWs. Our final sample is 1112 firms: 556 
firms reporting ITMWs in the ICOFR matched with 556 firms with non-IT MWs. A 
logistic regression analysis will be performed to predict the ITMWs after screening the 
data to check for the missing values, outliers, multicollinearity, and normality of the 
distribution.  
2.6.2. Sample Data 
We present some examples and categories of ITMWs reported in 10-K filings 
in Table 3 (Masli et al. 2009). For example, CONOLOG CORP (CIK: 0000023503), 
based on management’s assessment of internal control over financial reporting, as of 
July 31, 2011, the Company’s internal control over financial reporting was not 
effective due to the following material weaknesses: (1) The Company lacks adequate 
segregation of duties control concerning Information Technology (“IT”); (2) IT 
personnel perform accounting transactions, programming function and controls 
security function with the Company for IT; (3) The Company lacks appropriate 
environmental controls needed to ensure the security and reliability of IT equipment. 
Chang-On International, Inc (CIK: 0000042136), based on 10-K filing as of 
December 31, 2011, there were control deficiencies that constituted material 
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weaknesses as described below: “We did not implement appropriate information 
technology controls – As of December 31, 2011, we retain copies of all financial data 
and material agreements; however, there is no formal procedure or evidence of normal 
backup of our data or off-site storage of the data in the event of theft, misplacement or 
loss due to unmitigated factors”. 
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Table 3: Examples of ITMWs 
IT 
Categories 
ITMWs Reported in SOX 404 
Access 
Controls 
 Inadequate restricted access to systems.           
 Segregation of duties not implemented in system.     
 IT personnel access not properly segregated.    
 Logical access issues.       
Enterprise 
Architecture 
 Inadequate information systems to support business 
processes.   
 Absence of general IT policies and procedures documented.  
 Deficiencies related to IT control design and operating 
effectiveness weaknesses.    
 Lacks appropriate environmental controls    
General 
IS/IT 
Controls 
 Lack of controls over spreadsheet.          
 Lack of IS/IT controls.            
 Lack of IS/IT controls across subsidiaries.               
IT Capability  Lack of understanding of key system configuration.    
 Inadequate IS/IT support staff.       
 Insufficient training on system.      
 Lack of systems and accounting software     
Security and 
Recovery 
 Insufficient disaster recovery plans or back up of systems.      
 Inadequate security.     
 There is no IT security policy.      
Application 
Controls 
 The Company did not maintain effective controls over end 
user computing applications, such as spreadsheets.    
 Ineffective controls and procedures related to certain IT 
applications and general computer controls.            
 Did not maintain effective controls related to IT applications 
and infrastructure.     
 Lack of application controls.        
Application 
Development 
 The company’s ERP system contained programming errors.   
 Limited ERP systems.           
 Limited IT application functionality.        
 Inadequate program/data change controls.        
 Program change management        
 Program development                    
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2.7. Data Analysis and Results 
2.7.1. Univariate Analysis 
The industry distribution of the 556 firms with ITMWs is provided in Table 4. 
We categorize the industry as 13 industry groups, which are different from previous 
literature with 10 groups (Li et al. 2007). In our study, we divide the manufacturing 
group into diverse subgroups: food, textiles, chemical and refining, computers and 
electronics, and miscellaneous equipment industry. Since we study the ITMWs, we 
categorize the IT-intensive manufacturing companies into a separate group. We find 
that the sample firms with ITMWs cover 12 out of the 13 industry groups. The service 
industry contains the highest number of firms with ITMWs, followed by the 
manufacturing industry. 
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Table 4: ITMWs reported by industry segments 
2 digit 
SIC 
Industry Segments # of 
ITMW 
Firms 
% of 
ITMW 
Firms 
01-09  Agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting and trapping 1.0 0.0 
10-14  Mining 89.0 8.0 
15-17 Construction  4.0 0.4 
20-34 Manufacturing (Food, textiles, chemical,  refining, 
rubber)  
230.0 20.7 
35-36 Manufacturing (Computers and Electronic) 196.0 17.6 
37-39 Manufacturing (Miscellaneous equipment) 92.0 8.3 
40-49 Transportation and Communication 88.0 7.9 
50-51 Wholesale trade 38.0 3.4 
52-59 Retail trade 38.0 3.4 
60-67 Finance, insurance and real estate 34.0 3.1 
70-89 Service industry 286.0 25.7 
91-97 Public administration 0.0 0.0 
99 Other 16.0 1.4 
Total  1112 100 
 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics and the univariate tests results. The mean, 
standard deviation (std.dev), median, and significance are listed in Table 5. The results 
of univariate analysis indicate that, compared to firms without ITMWs, the firms 
disclosing ITMWs significantly have higher probability of loss, operate more business 
segments, are more likely to have foreign sales, have higher level of inventory and 
undergo restructuring and mergers and acquisitions, which are all consistent with prior 
studies. In addition, firms with stronger IT governance seem to be less likely to have 
ITMWs. With respect to control variables, firms with ITMWs appear to be 
significantly older than the firms with effective IT internal controls. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics in study 1 
 Mean Std.dev Median N 
LOSS: 
ITMWs sample 
Control Sample 
 
0.646** 
0.588 
 
0.479 
0.493 
 
- 
- 
 
556 
556 
ZSCORE: 
ITMWs sample 
Control Sample 
  
-0.293 
-0.854 
 
24.844 
21.265 
 
0.785 
0.719 
 
556 
556 
SEGs: 
ITMWs sample 
Control Sample 
 
2.212** 
2.011 
 
1.668 
1.606 
 
1 
1 
 
556 
556 
FRNSALE: 
ITMWs sample 
Control sample 
 
0.421** 
0.360 
 
0.494 
0.480 
 
- 
- 
 
556 
556 
INVNTRY: 
ITMWs sample 
Control sample 
 
0.102** 
0.086 
 
0.138 
0.136 
 
0.030 
0.022 
 
556 
556 
GROWTH: 
ITMWs sample 
Control sample 
 
2.942 
4.610 
 
45.471 
78.979 
 
0.109 
0.101 
 
556 
556 
RSTRCHA: 
ITMWs sample 
Control sample 
 
0.385* 
0.329 
 
0.487 
0.470 
 
- 
- 
 
556 
556 
MA: 
ITMWs sample 
Control sample 
 
0.629*** 
0.538 
 
0.483 
0.499 
 
- 
- 
 
556 
556 
ITGOV: 
ITMWs sample 
Control sample 
 
2.950** 
3.264 
 
2.041 
2.264 
 
2.530 
2.633 
 
556 
556 
SIZE: 
ITMWs sample 
Control sample 
 
4.098 
3.926 
 
2.886 
2.915 
 
4.565 
4.588 
 
556 
556 
AGE: 
ITMWs sample  
Control sample 
 
18.963*** 
16.054 
 
16.342 
13.937 
 
15.500 
13.000 
 
556 
556 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates significant level at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 or better, 
respectively based on t-statistics in means. P-values are two tailed. See Table 2 for 
variable definitions. 
 
Table 6 presents the correlations among the variables. Some variables are 
correlated with one another. However, the largest correlation is 0.410 between SEGs 
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and SIZE, followed by -0.403 between LOSS and SIZE, 0.384 between RSTRCHA 
and SIZE, and 0.380 between RZSCORE and INVTRY. Most of the values of all other 
correlations are very small, which fall below 0.3, and the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) in the regression is less than 2, which indicates that the indicator variables in the 
model have distinct features, and there are no multicollinearity problems in our 
regression
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2.7.2. Logistic Regression Analysis 
A logistic regression analysis is performed to model the probability of reporting 
ITMWs over financial reporting as a function of 11 predictors as we discussed above. 
ITMW is a dependent variable. It is coded as 1 if the firm discloses ITMWs in the SOX 
404 reports and 0 for control firms with effective IT internal controls. We transform 
GROWTH to be the decile rank of the average sales growth from year 2t  to year t  
(RGROWTH), and we also transform SEGs to the log of the number of business 
segments because of the documented skewness in the distribution of GROWTH and 
SEGs. 
Table 7 provides the results of logistic regression analysis. A test of full model 
with all eleven predictors: 9 independent variables and 2 control variables, against a 
constant-only model is statistically reliable with 
2 (11, N=1112) = 46.27, p<.001. It 
indicates that the predictors reliably distinguished between firms that disclosing 
ITMWs and not disclosing ITMWs. Predicted success is adequate, with 59.7% of the 
ITMWs firms and 55.0% of the effective IT internal control firms identified correctly 
and an overall success rate of 57.4%. Table 7 displays the regression coefficients, Wald 
statistics, and statistical significances p-value for each of the 11 predictors. According 
to the results, after controlling for the firm size and age, we find that the estimated 
coefficient of LOSS is significantly associated with ITMWs, and suggests that firms 
with loss are more likely to have ITMWs. Thus, H1a is supported. The estimated 
coefficient of RZSCORE is not significantly associated with ITMWs. Therefore, H1b 
is not supported. The results also indicate that firms involved in foreign sales as well as 
engaged in merges and acquisitions are more likely to have ITMWs in the ICOFR, 
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supporting our H2b and H4b. The coefficients of SEGs, INVTRY and RGROWTH are 
not significantly associated with ITMWs, providing no support for H2a, H3a and H3b. 
In addition, the coefficient of our new construct ITGOV is significantly associated with 
ITMWs. Thus, H5 is supported. The findings empirically validate the importance of IT 
governance in reducing ITMWs. 
Our results confirm some of the results reported from previous general internal 
controls studies (Ge & McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007), 
and also illustrate the difference between ITMWs and MWs. Our findings suggest that 
there is no significant difference with the business segments operations between 
ITMWs firms and control firms. This is an interesting and counter-intuitive result. One 
possible explanation is that firms might use firm-wide IT standards to replicate and roll 
out information systems in various industry segments. The common and recurrent use 
of IT related know-how might create economies of scope, thus operating in multiple 
segments might not lead to ITMWs. Our findings also indicate that there is no 
significant difference with the higher level of inventory between ITMWs firms and 
control firms. One plausible explanation is that information systems may help firms to 
accurately deal with the data and processes due to the scalability and agility of the 
technology.  In addition, our results suggest that there is no significant difference with 
the rapid growth and restructuring between ITMWs firms and control firms. One 
possible explanation is that rapid growing and restructuring firms may have more 
innovation to respond to technology change. 
With respect to control variables, we find that older firms are more likely to 
have ITMWs, which is different from the previous study of general internal control 
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weaknesses (Doyle et al. 2007). We believe this could be because older firms are more 
likely to use legacy systems, and possibly personnel who are not familiar with newer 
technology.  
 
Table 7: Logistic regression analysis 
 Predicted 
sign 
Coefficients Wald p-value 
Intercept  -.861 10.385 .001 
LOSS 
 
+ .393 7.461 .006 
RZSCORE 
 
- .006 .058 .809 
SEGs 
 
- .191 .595 .440 
FRNSALE 
 
+ .224 2.938 .087 
INVNTRY 
 
+ .801 2.571 .109 
RGROW 
 
+ .016 .481 .488 
RSTRCHA 
 
+ .163 1.216 .270 
MA 
 
+ .378 7.795 .005 
ITGOV 
 
- -.089 7.800 .005 
SIZE + .017 .331 .565 
AGE 
 
+ .013 8.291 .004 
ITMWs firms predicted 
correctly                                 
59.7% 
Effective ITIC firms predicted 
correctly 
55.0% 
Overall percentage to predict 
correctly 
57.4% 
N 1112 
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2.7.3. Analysis of Recession Effects 
In the proposal stage of this dissertation, we collected three years data from Jan 
2008 to Dec 2010, which includes the economic recession (Q3, 2008 till Q1, 2009). 
The results indicate that there are some differences between the normal economic 
environment and the recession time period due to recession effects. First of all, LOSS 
seems to be significantly associated with ITMWs in the normal environment, but not 
significantly linked to ITMWs. One possible explanation is that firms may reduce 
investment in information systems and internal control systems due to the economic 
recession. In addition, INVTRY and RSTRCHA are not significantly associated with 
ITMWs in normal years, but significantly related to ITMWs in the recession period. 
One plausible explanation is that there are some uncertain or unexpected factors, which 
may be out of control during the recession. However, in the normal economic 
environment, firms may plan ahead to scale up the IT infrastructure and structures, set 
up firm-wide IT standards, and integrate a standard configuration into the IT 
infrastructure. This scaling of IT infrastructure to match business growth could result in 
INVTRY and RSTRCHA not being significant. 
2.8. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study is an early attempt to examine both firm level characteristics and IT 
governance associated with ITMWs in ICOFR. Our findings confirm some of the 
results reported from the previous studies of general internal control weaknesses (Ge & 
McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). We find that firms that 
disclose ITMWs tend to have higher probability of loss, have foreign sales, and are 
more likely to have mergers and acquisitions. In addition, the results provide the 
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evidence that firms with stronger IT governance are less likely to disclose IT internal 
control weaknesses.  
The difference between our results and previous findings relates to firm age 
(AGE), business segments (SEGs), inventory (INVNTRY), rapid growth 
(RGROWTH) restructuring (RSTRCHA). Our findings suggest that in contrast to 
traditional control deficiencies, older firms are more likely to have ITMWs. This could 
possibly be due to legacy system problems. Our results indicate that SEGs, INVNTRY, 
RGROWTH and RSTRCHA are not significantly associated with ITMWs. These are 
interesting results and could indicate that once appropriate IT internal controls are put 
in place, they scale up much better compared to traditional internal controls due to the 
scalability and agility of IT. 
The results are useful from both research as well as managerial perspectives. 
From a research perspective, this is one of the first studies to examine the antecedents 
of ITMWs from both firm characteristics and IT governance perspective. We propose 
and operationalize a new construct ITGOV according to corporate governance, IT 
leadership and IT governance literature. This study represents an important 
contribution to research in both Accounting Information Systems (AIS) and 
Management Information Systems (MIS). From a managerial perspective, our research 
understanding the characteristics and IT governance of organizations that are likely to 
have ITMWs helps management to take appropriate actions to remediate ITMWs; It 
could helpful for regulators to enact or update policies and standards to regulate the 
companies to provide the assurance of reliability and integrity of financial reporting to 
instill the investors’ confidence; It also helps investors to make investment carefully. 
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A potential limitation of this study is that our data is based on secondary data. It 
might have some unrecorded data or the limitation of the format of data reporting. In 
this study, we measure ITMW as a binary variable (1 vs. 0) instead of specific severity 
and real number of ITMWs. IT internal control for companies with more ITMWs (e.g., 
two or more) would be less effective comparing to companies with only one ITMW. 
However, it is not proper to measure ITMWs as real number since there is no standard 
for the data disclosing. For example, firm A discloses that it has inadequate restricted 
access to information systems, segregation of duties are not implemented in systems, 
IT personnel access is not properly segregated, and there are logical access issues; 
while firm B just say it has ITMWs due to lack of access controls. Since the four 
ITMWs disclosed in firm A are four categories of access controls. In this case, we 
cannot say firm A has more ITMWs than firm B by counting the real number. Further 
research could consider quantifying the measure of ITMWs and explore the effects of 
IT governance and firm-level characteristics on the degree of ITMWs when the data 
reporting is standardized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: IT GOVERNANCE, IT CAPABILITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: 
AN INTEGRATED MODEL 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we examine the impact of IT governance on IT capability, and 
effects of both IT governance and IT capability on firms’ market value creation and 
sustainable accounting performance. A firm’s IT capability refers to its ability to 
mobilize and deploy IT-based resources in combination or co-present with other 
resources and capabilities (Bharadwaj 2000). Lim et al. (2012) define IT capability as 
firms’ ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure IT with organizational and managerial 
processes in order to align with a rapidly changing competitive environment (Lim et al. 
2012). 
The relationship between IT capability and firm performance has been studied 
by prior literature (Bharadwaj 2000; Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Muhanna and Stoel 
2010), which concludes that firms with superior IT capability achieve superior firm 
performance. IT business value research (Barua and Mukhopadhyay 1995; 
Mukhopadhyay 1995; Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Bharadwaj 2000; Santhanam and 
Hartono 2003; Brynjolffson and Hitt 2000) has examined the impact of IT on business 
value and organizational performance. However, research to examine the effect of IT 
governance on IT capability is limited (Lim et al. 2012), and the information systems 
field lacks studies that simultaneously investigate the impacts of both IT governance 
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and IT capability on firms’ market value creation and sustainable accounting 
performance. 
To fill this gap, we intend to answer the following research questions in this 
study: (a). How is IT governance linked to IT capability?  
(b). How do both IT governance and IT capability impact firm performance? 
To answer these questions, we draw upon and integrate three research streams 
to develop our model: (1) Studies that investigate the impact of IT capability on firm 
performance (Bharadwaj 2000; Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Wang and Alam 2007; 
Muhanna and Stoel 2010). (2) Studies that examine the effects of corporate governance 
and IT governance on firm performance (Brown and Caylor 2006; Boritz and Lim 
working paper; Lunardi et al. 2009). (3) Study that examines the role of senior IT 
executives and IT governance on IT capability (Lim et al. 2012). IT business value 
literature (Barua and Mukhopadhyay 1995; Mukhopadhyay 1995; Bharadwaj et al. 
1999; Brynjolffson and Hitt 2000) helps us understand how investment and innovation 
in IT impact firms’ business performance and value. IT capability literature (Bharadwaj 
2000; Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Wang and Alam 2007; Muhanna and Stoel 2010) 
illustrates that IT capability is an important factor differentiating competitive firms 
from less competitive firms. IT governance literature (Amstrong and Sambamurthy 
1999; Bassellier et al. 2003; Li et al. 2007) provides us a guideline with a theoretical 
basis to investigate firms’ IT resources and their ability to effectively integrate and 
deploy IT resources in combination with other resources to create unique competitive 
advantage.  
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Using a sample of U.S. firms ranked by Information Week based on their 
technology strategies and practices, we examine the impact of IT capability on firm 
performance. In particular, we examine how IT governance and IT capability help to 
achieve firms’ competitive advantage using both a market value measure and a 
sustainable accounting performance measure. In addition, we study how IT governance 
affects IT capability. 
This study contributes to accounting information systems (AIS) and 
management information systems (MIS) literature in several ways.  First, this is the 
first study to investigate the impact of IT governance on IT capability. Second, our 
study contributes to the IT business value literature by simultaneously examining the 
differential effects of IT governance and IT capability on firms’ sustainable accounting 
performance and market valuation. Third, our study also contributes to the AIS 
literature with a comprehensive measurement of IT governance. Fourth, our study 
represents one of the few studies that empirically test the resource-based theory in the 
IT governance domain. 
The rest of the study 2 is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a literature 
review. Section 3.3 introduces the theoretical background and develops the hypotheses. 
Section 3.4 describes the definition of variables and presents the research model. 
Section 3.5 discusses the research methods and data collection procedures. Section 3.6 
provides data analysis and the empirical results. The final section discusses the 
contributions and implications of the study and offers some concluding comments. 
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3.2. Literature Review 
This section builds on three research streams within the IT business value 
literature, which we described in the introduction section, there still exists potential 
knowledge gap about the understanding of the IT governance measure and impacts, 
and the driver of firms’ competitive advantage. The research gap can be filled by 
integrating three research streams on IT governance and IT capability. We review the 
literature as below.  First, we discuss the impact of IT capability on firm performance, 
mainly on firms’ accounting performance. Second, we review the role of senior IT 
executives and IT governance on firm performance. Finally, we discuss the role of 
senior IT executives and IT governance on IT capability.  
3.2.1. IT Capability and Firm Performance 
A large body of research has explored the impact of IT capability on firm 
performance. The pioneering empirical study by Bharadwaj (2000) suggested a link 
between IT capability and firms’ accounting-based measures of current performance. 
This study contends that IT capability creates unique competitive advantages and 
intangible assets for a firm and firms with a high IT capability achieve and sustain 
superior performance based on profit- and cost-based performance measures using data 
in the early 1990s. Similar to Bharadwaj (2000), a subsequent analysis by Santhanam 
and Hartono (2003) controlled for prior financial performance, and concluded that 
firms with superior IT capability exhibit superior current and sustained firm 
performance when compared to average industry performance.  
Based on post year 2000 (Y2K) data, more recent studies have investigated the 
impact of IT capability on firms’ competitive advantage with mixed results. Wang and 
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Alam (2007) explored the relationship between IT capability and firm valuation, future 
earnings uncertainty and financial analysts’ forecast accuracy, and found that IT 
capability is value-relevant and provides incremental explanatory power for firm 
valuation beyond traditional accounting information. Muhanna and Stoel (2010) used 
two unique archival data sets representing the immediate pre-Internet (1992-1994) and 
the post-Internet (1999-2006) commercialization eras to examine the effects of IT 
capability and IT spending on market value and actual accounting performance, and 
concluded that IT capability is value-relevant, and is positively associated with actual 
future earnings; However, Masli et al. (2011) considered the structural shifts in the 
return from IT capability over time, and examined the impact of superior IT capability 
on firm performance over the 1988-2007 period. Their findings suggested that firms 
with superior IT capability are able to attain higher firm performance levels until 1999. 
However, such performance advantage disappears in the post-1999 time period. Hence, 
it is necessary to better understand the impact of IT capability on firms’ market 
valuation as well as sustainable accounting performance in the post-Internet eras.  
A further investigation of the role of IT capability on firms’ competitive 
advantage is needed. In this study, we attempt to reconcile these seemingly conflicting 
results and advance our understanding of the association between IT and firm 
performance by proposing and testing a model that focuses on market valuation as well 
as firms’ sustainable accounting performance. A key distinguishing feature of our 
study is that we simultaneously examine the effects of both IT governance and IT 
capability on firm performance. In contrast, prior studies have focused on investigating 
the effects of each of these two IT-related factors in isolation from each other. 
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The most similar study to ours is a recent paper by Lim et al. (2012) who 
investigated the impact of the role of IT executives on the relationship between IT 
capability and firm performance. They concluded that there is a positive relationship 
between hierarchical power of senior IT executives and the likelihood that a firm will 
develop superior IT capability, and that the contribution of IT capability to a firm’s 
competitive advantage is much stronger in firms with powerful senior IT executives. 
However, Lim et al. (2012) only studied IT executives’ role. In contrast, in our paper, 
we construct a comprehensive measurement of IT governance including IT executives’ 
role and other important factors. 
3.2.2. IT Governance and Firm Performance 
IT governance is defined by IT Governance Institute (ITGI) as “the 
responsibility of the Board of Directors and executive management.  It is an integral 
part of enterprise governance and consists of the leadership and organizational 
structures and processes that ensure that the organization’s IT sustains and extends the 
organization’s strategy and objectives” (ITGI 2001). IT governance is “the 
organizational capacity exercised by the Board, executive management and IT 
management to control the formulation and implementation of IT strategy and in this 
way ensure the fusion of business and IT” (De Haes and Grembergen 2004, pp.1). 
Despite considerable research on IT governance, there is limited research on the 
effectiveness of IT governance in deriving business value from IT investments. The 
few studies on this issue have obtained mixed results. Weill and Ross (2004) conducted 
a survey of IT governance in 256 companies worldwide during the period 1999-2003 
and found that “firms with superior IT governance have at least 20% higher profits 
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than firms with poor IT governance, given the same strategic objectives.” (Weill and 
Ross 2004; Gu et al. 2008; Lunardi et al. 2009). The study suggested that IT 
governance is strongly associated with overall firm performance. Chatterjee et al. 
(2001) used the event study methodology to examine market reactions to 
announcements of new CIO positions. Dehning and Stratopoulos (2003) examined and 
tested the factors that are believed to lead to a sustainable competitive advantage due to 
IT-enabled strategy, and suggested that managerial IT skills are positively linked to the 
sustainability of a firm’s competitive advantage.  
Boritz and Lim (working paper) investigated the relationship between effective 
IT governance, IT material weaknesses and firm performance, and suggested that firms 
with IT governance mechanisms (IT strategy committee, CIO) have higher levels of 
firm performance. In their paper, they measure the effectiveness of IT governance as a 
function of the IT knowledge of top company executives and board members, the 
presence of IT strategy committee, and the tenure of CIO. In contrast, in our paper, we 
construct a more comprehensive measure of IT governance (ITGOV-Score) with 3 
categories and 11 factors.  
The IT governance matrix is developed upon the corporate governance 
literature (Brown and Caylor 2006). In the corporate governance literature, Gov-Score 
is created as a summary governance measure based on 51 firm-specific provisions 
representing both internal and external governance. Similarly, we construct ITGOV-
score based on both internal and external IT governance factors including oversight, 
leadership IT background, and IT leadership importance. This construct is related to the 
definition of IT governance. IT background and importance are factors since they are 
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driving force for effective and efficient IT governance to help to ensure the fusion of 
business and IT. The reason we include oversight factors in our measurement is 
because the board effectiveness in its monitoring function is determined by its 
independence, size, and composition (insider and outsider) (John and Senbet 1998), 
and the oversight function is to control the formulation and implementation of IT 
strategy. ITGOV-Score is broader in scope, and is an improvement of Boritz and Lim’s 
measurement. 
3.2.3. IT Governance and IT Capability 
Prior research has examined the role of senior IT executives on IT capability 
(Khallaf and Skantz 2011, Lim et al. 2012). Khallaf and Skantz (2011) found that CIO 
appointments improve firm performance but the improvement in performance largely is 
limited to firms appointing a CIO for the first time. Lim et al. (2012) found that there is 
a positive relationship between the hierarchical power of senior IT executives and the 
likelihood that the firm will develop superior IT capability. They also suggested that 
the contribution of IT capability to a firm’s competitive advantage is much stronger in 
firms with powerful senior IT executives since they are the driving force that may 
ensure the continuous renewal of IT capability. In our study, we propose that effective 
IT governance enhances the firms’ ability to develop superior IT capability. Building 
on existing literature (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999, Lim et al. 2012), this study 
argues that there is a positive relationship between IT governance and the likelihood 
that the firm will develop superior IT capability.  
Examining the three streams of literature, there exist potential gaps. Figure 2 
summarizes the major points of review from previous literature and proposes a new 
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model. Figure 2 - A shows that the role of IT executives impacts firm performance 
through IT capability. Figure 2 - B shows that effective IT governance is positively 
related to firm performance through reducing IT material weaknesses. Figure 2 - C 
shows that corporate governance is positively linked to firm performance. From the 
literature, a potential gap is identified and can be filled by incorporating the streams. 
The resulting model is showing in Figure 2-D, and the justification of the model is 
illustrated in the following section. 
A: IT Capability and Firm Performance 
 
 
B: IT Governance and Firm Performance 
 
 
C: Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
 
 
D: Synthesis 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Literature review and synthesis 
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3.3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
The resource-based view theory (RBV) has been used in IT business value 
research to answer the question of IT business value and competitive advantage from 
IT (Mata et al. 1995; Powell and Dent-Micallef 1997; Bharadwaj 2000; Wade and 
Hulland 2004; Ray et al. 2005). Drawing upon RBV theory, a firm’s ability to 
effectively build, integrate and deploy IT resources in combination with other 
resources, can create unique competitive advantages and intangible assets for a 
company (Bharadwaj 2000; Santhanam and Hartono 2003). The primary purpose of 
this study is to investigate how IT governance and IT capability affect the firms’ 
market value and sustainable accounting performance. The reason that we use both 
market value measure and sustainable accounting performance measure is described in 
the section of variable definitions. To accomplish this, RBV theory, therefore, seems 
well positioned to inform examinations of the relationship between IT governance, IT 
capability and firm performance. 
3.3.1. IT Governance and Firm Performance 
According to previous literature of the impact of corporate governance structure 
on firm performance (Daily and Dalton 1993; Brown and Caylor 2006), we expect that 
there is a linkage between IT governance and firm performance since firms with 
stronger IT governance may carve out competitive advantage in driving technology 
decisions and remaining costs under control. IT governance is an integral part of 
corporate governance, and is implementing processes, structures, and relational 
mechanisms in the enterprise that enable both IT and business person to execute their 
responsibilities in support of IT/business alignment and the creation of IT business 
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value (Grembergen and De Haes 2009; Wilkin and Chenhall 2010). Weill (2004) 
indicates that all organizations have IT governance. Firms with effective governance 
have actively designed a set of IT governance mechanisms (e.g., committees, 
processes, IT organizational structure, etc.) that encourage behaviors consistent with 
the firms’ strategies and values (Weill 2004).  Good IT governance draws upon 
corporate governance principles to manage and use IT to achieve superior firm 
performance. Boritz and Lim (working paper) have examined the relationship between 
IT governance and firm performance, and suggests that IT governance mechanisms 
contribute to improved firm performance after taking into account their impact on 
ITMWs. IT assets have been embedded in an organization’s daily operations and 
strategies, such as transactions, processes, services and analyses. Studies suggest that a 
big portion of the business value generated by IT comes from complementarities 
between IT and organizational practices (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000; Basu and 
Jarnagin 2008). Effective IT governance differentiates the organizations’ unique assets 
in the use of IT, while ensuring compliance with the firms’ overall mission, vision and 
principles. Therefore, we believe that firms with effective IT governance may maintain 
unique assets in human IT resources such as IT skills and experience, IT-enabled 
resources such as IT knowledge assets and IT processes, and are more likely to have 
competitive advantage to achieve superior firm performance.  
Using the same measurement of IT governance in study 1, we consider three 
aspects of IT governance mechanisms: oversight (outside committees), leadership IT 
background and IT leadership importance.  We believe that for firms with good 
oversight function, their outside and independent boards are more likely to effectively 
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monitor the inside boards and leadership in using IT to realize IT/business alignment 
and achieve business value of IT. Executive leadership has long been embraced as 
necessary for corporates to fully explore the benefits of IT (Freeman 1969; O’Toole 
1966; Rockwell 1968; Chatterjee et al. 2001). Bassellier et al. (2003) state that the set 
of IT-related experiences that executives possess enables them to exhibit IT leadership 
in their area of business. IT experience increases their understanding of IT, which in 
turn enables them to increase their leadership in the IT domain. Top Managers, 
executives, board of directors and committee members are more likely to assume 
leadership in regard to IT when they have the appropriate IT experience and knowledge 
(Bassellier et al., 2003). Thus, we argue that firms with leadership IT background may 
have unique human IT resources (e.g. IT skills and IT experience) in using IT to realize 
business value of IT. We also argue that firms with IT leadership importance, say, 
consider the critical role of IT leadership such as CIO position and compensation, 
longer tenured CIO, and IT strategy committee, are more likely to be motivated to 
make efficient IT investment, implementation and maintenance, and have stronger IT 
organizational structure to achieve business value of IT investment. As a result, it may 
achieve superior firm performance.  Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H1a:  IT governance will be positively associated with the firms’ market valuation. 
H1b: IT governance will be positively associated with the firms’ sustainable 
accounting performance.  
3.3.2. IT Capability and Firm Performance 
The definition of IT capability varies. Bharadwaj defines IT capability as “its 
ability to mobilize and deploy IT-based resources in combination or co-present with 
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other resources and capabilities” (Bharadwaj 2000, pp. 171). Lim et al. refer to IT 
capability as firms’ ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure IT with organizational 
and managerial processes in order to align with a rapidly changing competitive 
environment (Lim et al. 2012). Wang and Alam (2007) point that IT capability depends 
on how a firm uses IT investments with other resources in innovative ways to create 
unique competitive advantages and intangible assets, such as technical and managerial 
skills, knowledge-based assets, customer orientation and synergy (Wang and Alam 
2007). In this dissertation, we refer to IT capability as firms’ ability to innovatively 
implement and deploy IT resources in the process of business to obtain IT/business 
strategies and create distinctive advantages. 
Organizational intangible assets have been recognized as important drivers of 
firms’ competitive differentiates (Bharadwaj 2000). Organizations and IT users care 
more about whether IT investment creates intangible resources such as increased 
markets and sales, and bring business value for the firms. Building on RBV theory, 
firms’ IT capability is valuable, rare, inimitable, and/or non-substitutable (Wernerfelt 
1984; Newbert 2007; Lim et al. 2012).  We believe that firms with superior IT 
capability are more likely to have compatible IT infrastructure, competent human IT 
resources, and effective intangible IT-enabled resources. Therefore, such firms are 
much better at building and integrating innovative firm-specific IT resources with other 
business resources and managing the technical and market risks associated with the 
deployment and use of those resources. In addition, due to more competent human IT 
resources in terms of both technical and managerial IT skills, firms with superior IT 
capability are better able to make the right decisions about IT spending, IT investment 
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and IT development, and they are more likely to turn those IT investments into true 
value in terms of enhanced productivity and efficiency, improved marketing 
reflections, increased product quality/differentiation, improved customer service, and 
shortened product life cycle, and so on (Bharadwaj 2000; Muhanna and Stoel 2010; 
Lim et al. 2012). As a result, it will enhance firms’ sustainable earnings and earnings 
potential, and improve firms’ ability to deploy IT for strategic goals. This expectation 
in turn should be reflected in the firm’s sustainable accounting performance and market 
value. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
H2a: IT capability will be positively associated with the firms’ market valuation. 
H2b: IT capability will be positively associated with the firms’ sustainable 
accounting performance. 
3.3.3. IT Governance and IT Capability 
IT governance involves a set of mechanisms for ensuring the attainment of 
necessary IT capabilities (Loh and Venkatraman 1992; Henderson and Venkatraman 
1993; De Haes and Grembergen 2005; Brown and Grant 2005). IT governance affects a 
firm’s capability to leverage IT synergies across business units (Gu et al. working 
paper). Thus, we propose that there is relationship between IT governance and IT 
capability since IT governance has a positive impetus to achieve firms’ superior IT 
capability.  
Firms with stronger IT governance are more likely to have the business and IT 
knowledge needed to nurture organizational learning. Daily and Dalton (1993) stated 
that outside board members may enhance the firms’ reputation due to their own 
experience, accomplishment, and exposure. In addition, outside board members are 
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aligned with the notion of resource independence theory indicates that the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the firm relies on the ability of key organizational members to act as 
boundary spanner and oversight function (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Daily and Dalton 
1993). Therefore, we believe that firms with stronger oversight function, their outside 
board members (e.g. big 4 audit committees), are more likely to oversee the inside 
board members for IT activities and may enhance firms’ ability to integrate IT 
resources in combining with other resources. In addition, if firms have more 
independent directors, they may have stronger monitor function to help them reduce 
firms’ IT-related risks and lead to superior IT capability. 
ITGI indicates that IT governance is as critical at the board and management 
level as corporate governance, and provides frameworks to assist enterprise leaders 
ensure that IT supports business goals and maximizes IT investment, with appropriate 
management of risks and opportunities (Wilkin and Chenhall 2010). Firms whose 
leadership teams have more IT experience and knowledge are more likely to have 
ability and skills to deploy IT innovations. For example, given the fast growing of 
technical innovation for information systems, if firms’ top management has IT 
experience, they are more likely to implement and infuse new technology to improve 
business operations and customer experience.  
In addition, with the organizations’ operational dependence on IT, information 
assets (e.g. database, spreadsheet) are significant for an organization. The CIO and IT 
strategic committee are able to better manage critical corporate information assets since 
they are more likely to have the fundamental knowledge about IT, such as, IT risk, 
expense and competitive risk (Nolan and McFarlan 2005). Therefore, firms with IT 
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leadership importance (e.g. CIO position and compensation, tenured CIO and IT 
strategy committee, etc.) are more likely to drive technology initiatives (e.g. deployed 
business intelligence tools, adopted online collaboration tools) and effectively manage 
critical corporate information assets, and result in superior capability to integrate their 
IT into business operations. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H3: IT governance will be positively associated with IT capability.  
3.4. Variable Definitions and Research Model 
Based on the hypotheses, firm performance is affected by firms’ IT governance 
and IT capability. IT governance also plays a role in firms’ IT capability superiority. 
The research model is shown as Figure 3.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
Figure 3: The research model of study 2 
 
3.4.1. Dependent Variables (Firm Performance Measurements) 
We believe that IT capability and IT governance are not only linked to actual 
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previous studies which take one measurement into consideration. We use two measures 
of firm performance: average return on assets (AROA) and Tobin’s q. Return on assets 
(ROA) identifies a company’s ability to generate profits from its assets, and has been 
widely used in previous studies (Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996; Tam 1998; Barua et al. 
1995; Rai et al. 1997; Floyd and Wooldridge 1990; Bharadwaj 2000; Dehning and 
Stratopouslos 2002). However, ROA measure only focuses on the current year 
profitability. To capture the long-term and sustainable profitability, we use the average 
of ROA over three years as the measure of sustainable accounting performance. The 
consideration of multiple years into the future allows for a possible time lag between 
investments in IT or IT capability and realization of potential value (Muhanna and 
Stoel 2010). It is an improved measurement of firms’ accounting performance. 
Average ROA over three years (AROA) is calculated as ( tROA + 1tROA + 2tROA )/3. 
In addition, we use Tobin’s q as market value of firm performance, which is a 
forward-looking, risk-adjusted, and less susceptible to changes in accounting practices. 
Tobin’s q has been widely used to represent the market expectations of future firm 
performance and can be more likely to capture and represent IT contribution to 
intangible value (Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Masli et al. 2011; Lim et al. 2012). Consistent 
with previous literature (Chung and Pruitt 1994; Masli et al. 2011; Lim et al. 2012; 
Bharadwaj et al. 1999), Tobin’s q is a ratio of market value to book value of total 
assets, and is calculated as:  
Tobin’s q = (MVE+PS+DEBT)/TA 
Where MVE = market value of equity = (closing price of share at the end of the fiscal 
year)*(number of common shares outstanding); 
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PS = liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock; 
DEBT = (current liabilities – current assets) + (book value of inventories) + (long term 
debt), and TA = book value of total assets. 
Therefore, both AROA and Tobin’s q serve as dependent variables in this 
study. 
3.4.2. Independent Variables (IT Capability Measurement) 
 IT capability superiority: we use the top ranking of the annual 
InformationWeek 500 (IW500) as a proxy for firms that have superior IT capability. We 
code a firm as 1 if it appears in the top ranking as “IT leaders” in IW500; otherwise we 
code it as 0. 
3.4.3. Independent Variables (IT Governance Score) 
IT governance: we construct a comprehensive measure of IT governance called 
ITGOV-Score with 3 categories and 11 factors. In corporate governance literature 
(Brown and Caylor 2006), Gov-Score is created as a summary governance measure 
based on 51 firm-specific provisions representing both internal and external 
governance. Similarly, we construct ITGOV-score as a summary IT governance 
measure based on 11 factors encompassing three categories representing both internal 
and external IT governance. The measurement matrix is the same as Study 1.  
3.4.4. Control Variables 
Based upon a review of prior studies on IT investment and firm performance 
(Bharadwaj 2000; Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Wang and Alam 2007; Muhanna and 
Stoel 2010; Lim et al. 2012; Lim et al. 2013), we control for firm size and reputation 
(Market-to-book value ratio) which may have impact on firms’ IT capability 
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superiority. We control for firm age and possible halo effect of prior performance, 
which may be related with firm performance. We also include one-year sales growth 
rate (SG) in our model to control for future earnings growth. In addition, we control for 
advertising (ADV), research and development (R&D), and capital (CAP) expenditures 
that are potentially value-relevant intangible assets not included on the balance sheet, 
and might be associated with firm performance. The definition and description of the 
variables in our model are summarized in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Definition of variables in study 2 
Variables Observable 
measures 
Definition and description 
Tobin’s q  A ratio of market value [(fiscal year-end market value of 
equity) + (liquidating value of the firms’ outstanding 
preferred stock) + (current liabilities)-(current assets) + 
(book value of inventories) + (long-term debt)] to book 
value of total assets. 
AROA  Average return on assets over three years (t, t+1, t+2). 
ITCAP  1 if a firm is ranked as “IT leaders” in IW500; 0 otherwise. 
ITGOV Big4 1 if auditor is a big four, 0 otherwise. 
INDBRD Percentage of independent directors on the board. 
CEFOIT 1 if the CEO or CFO has IT-related experience; 0 
otherwise. 
MGMTIT Percentage of top management with IT-related experience. 
BRDIT Percentage of Board of directors with IT-related 
experience. 
COMMIT Percentage of audit committee members with IT-related 
experience. 
CITO 1 if company has CIO or CTO position; 0 otherwise. 
CITOYR Number of years (s)he has been the position in the 
company. 
lnCIOCOMP The natural log of the CIO salary and bonus in the year of 
disclosing ITMWs and/or the preceding year. 
CIOTMTCOMP The ratio of the CIO salary and bonus to the average salary 
and bonus of the non-IT executive. 
ITSTRCOMT 1 if company has IT strategic committee; 0 otherwise. 
Control 
variables 
SIZE Firm size: the natural logarithm of the total assets 
(Compustat #6) of the firm. 
AGE Firm age: the log of the number of years the firm has 
CRSP data. 
ROA(t-1) One-year-lagged return on asset: earnings before 
extraordinary income/assets for firm j in year t-1. 
SG One-year sales growth rate: sales for firm j in year t / sales 
for firm j in year t-1. 
MB Market -to-book ratio: market valuation /book value of 
equity. 
ADV Advertising expense/sales. 
R&D Research and development expense/sales. 
CAP Capital expenditures/sales. 
AROA = Average return on assets 
ITCAP = IT capability superiority 
ITGOV = IT governance 
 
62 
 
3.5. Research Methodology 
3.5.1. Data Sources and Collection 
Following the prior studies (Bharadwaj 2000; Santhanam and Hartono 2003; 
Muhanna and Stoel 2010; Lim et al. 2012; Lim et al. 2013), InformationWeek 500 
(IW500) annual ranking index is used in this study to identify firms with superior IT 
capability. IW500 is a ranking system for IT investment and innovation, published 
annually by Information Week. IW500 ranks firms by the quantity of a firm’s 
technology or service investments as well as the quality of the firm’s innovative use of 
IT resources (InformationWeek 500 1995, Wang and Alam 2007). To be ranked in the 
IW500, firms with revenue of $250 million or more must complete a rigorous 
application on their technology strategies. The process includes quantitative and 
qualitative assessments of business technology innovation, whereby applicants earn 
points based on their responses to a questionnaire, and are also evaluated based on the 
achievements they outline in an essay submission. A panel of IW editors review the 
completed applications and determine the ranking based on the quantitative results and 
qualitative judgments (InformationWeek 500 2009). 
In this study, due to the availability and feasibility of data collection, we use a 
more recent data set from the period 2009-2010 to test our hypotheses regarding the 
value relevance and sustainable accounting performance of IT capability and IT 
governance. We follow Santhanam and Hartono (2003)’s study, and use top ranking 
firms that rated annually as IT leaders. We argue that firms rated in the top ranking 
may have more innovative investment in IT resources, and stronger ability to integrate 
their IT resources with other resources to achieve business strategies. We generate a 
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total of 242 firms with superior IT capability. We select 242 control firms from 
Compustat data by matching the firm size and industry, and it results in 484 firms as 
our total sample. Table 9 summarizes the sample selection process. 
We collect financial data from annual Compustat database, such as firms’ total 
assets, earnings, and book value of equity, etc. We retrieve firm stock data from CRSP 
database and obtain IT governance data from a combination of proxy statement, 10-K 
filings, firms’ website, and Mergent Online database. 
 
Table 9: Sample selection 
2009 2010 Total sample 
250 250 500 
  -193 (private, non-profit, no CIK) 
  - 65 (missing financial data) 
126 116 =242 (total test-sample) 
  +242 matching sample 
  =484 (total sample size) 
 
3.5.2. Two-Stage Econometrics Methods 
A two-stage econometric estimation is used to test the chain hypotheses that IT 
governance will affect firms’ IT capability superiority, and in turn drives firm 
performance. Since IT capable firms are ranked by the quantity of a firm’s technology 
or service investments as well as the quality of the firm’s innovative use of IT 
resources based on surveys, there are some unobserved variables (disturbance terms), 
For instance, firms’ strategies and culture, which may be correlated with firms’ IT 
capability superiority and might also cause superior firm performance. Therefore, IT 
capability can be an endogenous explanatory variable, which depends on some omitted 
variables. If the omitted variables are not accounted for in the model, the estimation 
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between IT capability and firm performance will be biased, which cause endogeneity 
bias in the regression. In our model, IT governance causes both IT capability and firm 
performance. There is also a cause relationship between IT capability and firm 
performance. To control for endogeneity bias and model the causal structure correctly, 
two-stage estimation will be used in this study.  
The two-stage method starts with estimating a logit regression of 
tcapabilityIT _  on firm size, firm reputation, and firms’ IT governance in the previous 
year (t-1). We believe that firms with larger size, higher reputation and stronger IT 
governance are more likely to receive public recognition for the quality of its IT 
capability, and be selected by experts as top ranking companies (Lim et al. 2011-2012; 
Lim et al. 2013). Following previous studies, we use natural log of total assets as a 
proxy for firm size; we use market-to-book value (MB) as a proxy for reputation since 
it captures tangible and intangible assets (Roberts & Dowling 2002; Lim et al. 2013), 
as well as the future growth potential. The measure of IT governance is listed in Table 
8.  
In the second stage, we estimate a regression of firm performance, which is 
measured by )2,1,(  tttAROA  and Tobin’s tq , on the predicted value of tcapabilityIT _
from the first estimation, IT governance, firm age, prior performance, one-year sales 
growth rate, advertising expenditure, research and development expenditure, and 
capital expenditure. 
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3.6. Data Analysis and Results 
3.6.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 10 provides the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the 
analysis. Panel A of Table 10 provides a sense for the data by listing the mean, 
standard deviation as well as median of each variable. Table 10 - Panel B provides the 
initial observations regarding the influence of IT governance on IT capable firms and 
non-IT capable firms. From the univariate tests results, firms with stronger IT 
governance and higher reputation (MB) seem to be more likely to have superior IT 
capability. 
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics in study 2 
Panel A 
 Mean Std.Dev Median N 
Tobin’s tq  1.030 0.773 
 
0.852 484 
 
2,1,  tttAROA  
 
0.035 
 
0.066 
 
0.030 
 
484 
tITCAP  0.500 0.501 - 484 
1tITGOV  4.355 2.143 
 
3.772 
 
484 
1tSIZE  9.026 
 
1.860 9.111 
 
484 
 
1tMB  0.836 
 
0.869 0.761 484 
 
1tROA  0.043 0.075 0.047 
 
484 
 
tADV  0.011 0.023 0.000 
 
484 
 
tDR &  0.028 0.062 
 
0.000 
 
484 
 
tCAP  0.069 0.117 0.035 
 
484 
 
tSG  0.036 
 
0.323 
 
0.006 484 
 
AGE 28.169 
 
22.313 21.750 
 
484 
 
Panel B 
1tITGOV : 
ITCAP sample 
Control Sample 
 
4.988*** 
3.721 
 
2.067 
2.031 
 
4.984 
2.801 
 
242 
242 
1tSIZE : 
ITCAP sample 
Control Sample 
 
9.100 
8.953 
 
1.904 
1.817 
 
9.157 
9.056 
 
242 
242 
1tMB : 
ITCAP sample 
Control sample 
 
0.931** 
0.736 
 
0.823 
0.907 
 
0.866 
0.662 
 
242 
242 
 
Table 11 presents the Pearson correlations among the main variables. Overall, 
the correlation analysis confirms the univariate results that IT governance is 
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significantly associated with IT capability. From the correlation matrix, most of the 
values of correlations are very small, which fall below  0.3 except MB and ROA 
(Pearson correlation coefficient 0.345 with p-value .0000). To examine the possibility 
of multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was checked and suggested to 
be less than 2, which are far less than 10. Therefore, there are no multicollinearity 
problems in the estimation. 
68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 T
ab
le
 1
1:
 P
ea
rs
on
 c
or
re
la
ti
on
 in
 s
tu
dy
 2
 
 
IT
C
A
P
 
IT
G
O
V
 
S
IZ
E
 
M
B
 
R
O
A
 
A
D
V
 
 
R
&
D
 
 
C
A
P
 
 
S
G
 
 
A
G
E
 
 
IT
C
A
P
 
1.
00
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IT
G
O
V
 
.2
96
**
*  
1.
00
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
IZ
E
 
.0
40
 
.0
30
 
1.
00
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
B
  
.1
12
**
 
.1
20
**
*  
-.
08
0*
 
1.
00
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
O
A
  
-.
00
5 
-.
10
8*
*  
-.
06
8 
.3
45
**
*  
1.
00
0 
 
 
 
 
 
A
D
V
 
 
-.
03
0 
.0
73
 
.0
17
 
.1
48
**
*  
.1
11
**
 
1.
00
0 
 
 
 
 
R
&
D
 
 
.1
14
**
 
.2
56
**
*  
-.
05
0 
.1
68
**
*  
.1
19
**
*  
.0
32
 
1.
00
0 
 
 
 
C
A
P
 
 
-.
15
3*
**
 
-.
06
6 
-.
02
4 
-.
02
0 
-.
01
1 
-.
04
0 
-.
06
7 
1.
00
0 
 
 
S
G
 
-.
02
0 
-.
04
5 
.0
64
 
.0
72
 
-.
03
5 
.0
01
 
-.
00
0 
-.
05
4 
1.
00
0 
 
A
G
E
 
 
.0
38
 
-.
04
3 
.3
75
**
*  
.0
82
*  
.0
61
 
.0
71
 
-.
00
0 
-.
05
5 
-.
06
5 
1.
00
0 
N
ot
es
: *
**
. C
or
re
la
ti
on
 is
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 a
t t
he
 0
.0
1 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
il
ed
).
 
**
. C
or
re
la
ti
on
 is
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 a
t t
he
 0
.0
5 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
il
ed
).
 
*.
 C
or
re
la
ti
on
 is
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
 a
t t
he
 0
.1
 le
ve
l (
2-
ta
il
ed
).
 
a.
 L
is
tw
is
e 
N
 =
 4
84
 
 
69 
 
 
3.6.2. Empirical Results 
A two-stage estimation is performed in this study to control for the endogeneity 
bias in the regression. Table 12 provides the econometric results according to two 
different measures of firm performance: Tobins’q and AROA. Table 12 - Panel A 
shows the results based on using Tobins’q as the dependent variable and Table 12 - 
Panel B provides the results based on AROA. The results provide a strong support for 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b. We find a positive relationship between IT capability and firms’ 
market valuation and sustainable accounting performance with the coefficients 0.473 
(p-value < 0.01) and 0.046 (p-value < 0.01) respectively, which indicates that firms 
with IT capability superiority bring firms’ competitive advantage from both market 
valuation and sustainable accounting earnings. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we find a 
positive association between IT governance and IT capability with the coefficient 0.330 
(p-value < 0.01), which suggests that firms with stronger IT governance are more likely 
to be ranked as IT capable firms.   
In addition, the findings suggest that there is a negative link between IT 
governance and firms’ market valuation and sustainable accounting performance, 
which do not support our Hypotheses 1a and 1b. This is an interesting but counter-
intuitive result. One possible explanation is that IT governance is one aspect of 
corporate governance and is a subset of corporate governance; it is possible that some 
other factors may affect firm performance, such as, organizational practices and 
changes. Chatterjee et al. stated that “a strong complementarity effect seems to exist, 
where IT investments must be aligned with other organizational changes in order for 
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the potential of IT to be fully realized” (Chatterjee et al. 2001, pp. 47).  Therefore, IT 
governance has to be aligned with other organizational resources including policies and 
rules, organizational practices and structure, business processes, and organizational 
culture, to fully create business value of IT governance investment (Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt 2000; Brynjolfsson et al. 2002; Melville et al. 2004). Another plausible 
explanation is that a proxy of IT governance may involve expenditures in CIO position, 
the compensation of CIO, and hiring executives with IT experience. Such expenditures 
might be captured as short time consumptions rather than investment, which may be 
reflected as negative factors in a short-term run. Thus, IT governance seems to not 
directly result in superior performance for organizations in the short run.  A related 
explanation is the lag effects. Interestingly, our findings provide evidence that IT 
governance in previous year t-1 is more negatively associated with Tobin’s q in year t 
comparing to the association with average return on assets in year t, t+1, and t+2, 
which confirms the findings from the literature that it may take several years for a 
company to realize value from its IT investments (Mahmood & Mann 2005; Gholami 
& Kohli 2012). However, the indirect impact of IT governance on firm performance 
mediated by IT capability is 0.156 and 0.015 respectively. This provides evidence that 
there is an overall positive impact of IT governance on firm performance after 
checking the overall coefficients effect, which indicates that IT governance may help 
firms build superior IT capability and indirectly create firms’ distinctive advantage. 
With respect to control variables, we find that firms with higher reputation are 
more likely to have superior IT capability. Firm performance in prior year has a 
significant impact on firm performance in current year and sustainable performance in 
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three years. Advertising expenditure is significantly associated with firm performance. 
R&D and capital expenditures are significantly associated with Tobins’q but not 
AROA. One possible explanation is that R&D and capital expenditures are considered 
as intangible assets as well as expenses. It might take longer time to be reflected in the 
actual future earnings. In addition, the results also imply that firm age is positively 
associated with sustainable accounting profitability. Age is proxy for a firm’s life cycle 
stage. In an early stage of the firm development (i.e. growing stage), firms tend to 
spend more to build business and tend to be less profitable compared to firms in more 
mature stage. Therefore, more mature firms are more likely to bring firms’ actual 
future earnings. However, it seems firm age is not significantly linked to market value 
expectation. One plausible reason is that unlike a more objective measure of 
accounting profitability, the capital market based measure Tobins’q is subject to the 
capital market sentiment. For example, the capital market traditionally has given a high 
valuation for technology stock (i.e., high market-to-book ratio or high price-to-earnings 
ratio) and many of IT leaders are from the technology sector, which reduce variability 
in Tobins’q with respect to the Age variable. 
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Table 12: Econometric results 
  
 
 
Predicted 
Sign 
Model 1 
(Firm performance:  
Tobins’q) 
 
Coefficient(Std. Err) 
Model 2 
(Firm performance: 
AROA) 
 
Coefficient(Std. Err) 
A: First-stage logit regression 
tITCAP  
Intercept  -1.164 (0.834) -1.164 (0.834) 
1tITGOV  + 0.330 (0.052)
***  0.330 (0.052)***
1tSIZE  + -0.013 (0.061) -0.013 (0.061) 
1tMB  + 0.259 (0.123)
** 0.259 (0.123)** 
Year dummy    
2009  0.066 (0.202) 0.066 (0.202) 
Industry 
dummies 
   
2  -0.279 (0.709) -0.279 (0.709) 
3  -0.599 (0.700) -0.599 (0.700) 
4  -0.266 (0.695) -0.266 (0.695) 
5  -0.444 (0.713) -0.444 (0.713) 
6  0.075 (0.708) 0.075 (0.708) 
7  -0.573 (0.695) -0.573 (0.695) 
8  -0.393 (0.897) -0.393 (0.897) 
Overall 
percentage to 
predict correctly 
 70% 70% 
N  484 484 
 
B: Second-stage linear regression 
Firm Performance (Tobin’s tq  and 2,1,  tttAROA ) 
Intercept  1.199 (0.154)*** 0.057 (0.015)*** 
tPITCA ˆ  + 0.473 (0.103)
*** 0.046 (0.010)*** 
1tITGOV  + -0.134 (0.033)
*** -0.013 (0.003)*** 
1tROA  + 3.714 (0.771)
*** 0.396 (0.078)*** 
tADV  + 8.521 (2.142)
*** 0.298 (0.134)** 
tDR &  + 2.811 (0.603)
*** -0.034 (0.110) 
tCAP  + 0.386 (0.134)
*** -0.009 (0.014) 
tAGE  + -0.0003 (0.001) 0.0004 (0.0001)
*** 
ttSG ,1  + 0.061 (0.084) 0.010 (0.008) 
2R   36% 30% 
N  484 484 
Notes: ***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
a. Listwise N = 484 
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3.7. Concluding Remarks and Discussion 
IT investment has become increasingly important in strategic decisions making 
for organizations, and IT business value remains one of the most interesting questions 
for researchers and practitioners. Prior studies have argued that IT capability, a firm’s 
ability to effectively integrate IT resources together with other organization resources, 
can create unique competitive advantages and intangible assets for an organization 
(Bharadwaj 2000; Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Muhanna and Stoel 2010). In this 
study we propose coupling IT governance with IT capability to evaluate their impacts 
on firm performance using both market-based firm valuation framework and 
sustainable accounting performance measurement. Our findings suggest that IT 
governance has positive effect on building superior IT capability. Our results also 
imply that superior IT capability positively affects firm performance from both firms’ 
valuation and sustainable accounting performance perspectives. In addition, these 
findings provide an interesting result that IT governance is negatively associated with 
firm performance. One plausible explanation is that IT governance has to be aligned 
with other organizational practices or changes to fully create business value of IT 
governance investment. Another possible explanation is the lag effects. It may take 
several years for an organization to realize value from its IT investments (Mahmood & 
Mann 2005; Gholami & Kohli 2012). Although IT governance seems not directly bring 
superior performance for organizations, it helps to build superior IT capability and 
indirectly create firms’ distinctive advantages. 
This study is expected to make several contributions to the growing literature 
on the business value of IT and IT capability. First, this study documents that IT 
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capability adds value to a firm’s forward-looking measure of firm performance and 
sustainable accounting performance beyond prior accounting performance. The 
measure of firm performance in this study is broader in scope. Second, this study also 
fills a void in prior literature by examining how IT governance affects IT capability, 
and provides evidence that firms with stronger IT governance are more likely to be 
ranked as IT leaders. Third, this study extends prior studies by simultaneously 
investigating the impacts of both IT governance and IT capability on firms’ 
competitive advantages. Finally, in this study we demonstrate a new way to construct a 
comprehensive measure of IT governance using secondary data. 
This study should also be of interest to professionals that guide boards and 
executive management and leadership teams in making IT investment decisions and 
using IT to create business value. Nowadays, we live in an era of information. IT has 
been playing a critical role on the growth and differentiation of an organization. 
Therefore, it is very important for firms’ executives to make careful decisions in 
integrating IT into their business strategic making. Our study highlights the important 
role of IT governance in building superior IT capability, and indirectly bring firms’ 
distinctive competitive advantages. Thus, it will help firms’ senior executives make 
decisions on the investment of IT governance.   
One potential limitation of this study is that our data is based only on recent two 
years’ data. Due to the availability and feasibility of data collection, I use IT capability 
in year 2010 since the most recent financial data are publicly available in Compustat 
database only until year 2012. To collect the average ROA (t, t+1, t+2), we end up with 
year 2010. We start from year 2009 with two years data since data collection is very 
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time consuming. We have enough samples to run the data analysis for the two years 
data. Further research could go back to collect more data from previous years to 
confirm the results.  
Another limitation is the measure of IT capability. InformationWeek500 
ranking index has been widely used as a proxy for superior IT capability (Bharadwaj 
2000; Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Wang and Alam 2007; Muhanna and Stoel 2010; 
Lim et al. 2012; Lim et al. 2013). However, such ranking may have some bias since IT 
leaders are ranked based on survey, which is not an objective evaluation of a 
company’s underlying IT resources (Bharadwaj 2000). Future research may consider 
the development of a more objective measure of IT capability. In addition, 
InformationWeek500 ranking are limited to large companies with revenues of $250 
million or more. Future research may consider generalizing the results in this study to 
smaller companies if there are data sources available. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 
4.1. Summary 
This dissertation applies empirical methodologies to examine how effective IT 
governance benefits organizations by improving IT internal control quality, and 
enhancing firms’ IT capability and creating competitive advantages resulting in 
improved firm performances. We conceptualize and operationalize a comprehensive 
measurement of IT governance based on secondary data and explore its impacts. 
The first study in Chapter 2 investigates the impacts of firm-level 
characteristics and IT governance on IT material weaknesses according to the 
integrated model from general internal control research. The findings suggest that firms 
with loss, involved in foreign sales, and engaged in mergers and acquisitions are more 
likely to have IT-related material weaknesses. In addition, firms with stronger IT 
governance may help in mitigating IT-related material weaknesses. Our results indicate 
that RZSCORE, business segments, inventory, rapid growth and restructuring are not 
associated with IT-related material weaknesses.  
The second study in Chapter 3 examines the impact of IT governance on IT 
capability and firm performance. The findings show that effective IT governance build 
firms’ IT capability superiority, and indirectly results in superior firm performance, but 
does not directly improve organizational performance. Our results illustrate that firms 
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with superior IT capability can create firms’ competitive advantages from both market 
valuation and sustainable accounting performance perspectives.  
4.2. Future Research 
Based on this dissertation, some extensions might be possible in order to 
broaden the measurement of IT governance and explore its impacts from different 
angles, and conduct rigorous research in this area. Particularly, in Chapter 2, further 
research could consider quantifying the measure of ITMWs and explore the effects of 
IT governance and firm-level characteristics on the degree of ITMWs when the data 
reporting is standardized. In addition, it would be promising to examine the mediation 
effects of IT governance in reducing ITMWs. In Chapter 3, it would be interesting to 
explore further on the technical part of IT governance including structures, processes, 
and mechanisms. Moreover, further work could confirm the results using longer time 
span for data collection and examine the different lag effects for different measures. 
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